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Just prior to General Colin Powell's retirement, a foreign affairs official chided him for 
being so reluctant to use military force in operations other than war.  Smarting from his 
experience in Vietnam and more recently in Somalia, General Powell recognizes the 
problematic and difficult situation a military force may suddenly and unexpectedly find 
itself in when conducting support and stability operations.1 A humanitarian, 
peacekeeping, or peace enforcement mission can quickly deteriorate into a conflict with 
insurgency elements.  When this occurs, the nature of the mission changes dramatically.  
Not only does the manpower and equipment requirement go up substantially, but also the 
conditions for mission success become far different.  These recent studies by Professor 
Anthony James Joes give the reader an appreciation for the difficulties a US-led 
counterinsurgency effort could encounter.  
In the first book, Guerrilla Conflict Before the Cold War, Joes analyzes four insurgencies 
prior to the Cold War.  He then offers today's policy makers lessons learned from each 
guerrilla conflict.  Finally, he focuses on guerrilla movements during the Cold War and 
scrutinizes their value in providing additional lessons learned to present policy makers.  
The four insurgencies examined in his study are the American Revolution, La Vendee 
during the French Revolution, Napoleon in Spain and the American Civil War.  Each 
guerrilla movement is carefully described in its own unique social-political-economic 
backdrop.  The author then analyzes the counter-insurgency campaign against the 
guerrillas.  He does not attempt to formulate a standard method of dealing with a guerrilla 
movement from these experiences.  Instead, he concludes each historical survey with a 
careful analysis of why the counter-insurgency efforts failed or were successful according 
to their own unique situations.  
One very interesting aspect of this portion of his study addresses the issue of dealing with 
the dynamics of compound warfare.2  The British in America and the French in Spain had 
to deal with both a regular army force and a partisan force during their respective 
conflicts.  In each case both counterinsurgency forces had an extremely difficult time 
trying to defeat each force simultaneously or separately.  He could have continued to 
explore this interesting subject during his analysis of the American Civil War, but 
chooses to explore why the Confederate army did not pursue a protracted guerrilla 
struggle before and then after the war was decidedly lost.  This does not detract from his 
study, however because his Civil War analysis is quite interesting.  Hopefully, Joes or 
another scholar will study this topic in more depth in the future.  
The final part of this publication evaluates "the proposition that guerrilla conflicts during 
the Cold War were sui generis to such a degree that they are of little value for policy 
guidance in the years to come." (Preface, p. xii)  This evaluation is accomplished in three 
ways.  First, Joes makes some general observations from pre-Cold War guerrilla struggles 
and compares them to Cold War insurgencies.  Second, the author considers the linkage 
of commitment and proximity/geography to the success or failure of both Cold War and 
pre-Cold War guerrilla movements.  Finally, he analyzes similarities and contrasts 
between specific counter-insurgency efforts conducted before and during the Cold War.  
Upon completing this examination, the author is led correctly to the conclusion that 
guerrilla struggles during the Cold War hold equally valuable lessons to those taken from 
pre-Cold War struggles.  
Professor Joes' second study, Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical and 
Bibliographical Sourcebook, offers a historical overview and analysis of guerrilla 
movements from the American Revolution to the post-Cold War insurgency in the 
Philippines.  The author provides some biographical profiles of prominent figures in the 
various guerrilla movements previously analyzed.  The study concludes with an extensive 
bibliography and collection of bibliographical essays dealing with guerrilla warfare.  
The historical survey analyzes over 40 guerrilla conflicts spanning a 220 year time 
period.  The conflicts take place on five continents and are associated with civil wars, 
major regional conflicts, world wars, colonial struggles, Cold War era peripheral 
struggles, etc.  Although the author's approach to this survey is general in nature, he 
successfully provides the reader with a starting point in conducting a critical cause and 
effect analysis of the various insurgencies.  This historical review then shifts its focus 
toward an analysis of French, British, American and Russian counterinsurgency styles.  
The mixed counterinsurgency record of each nation is discussed.  Lastly, the study 
concludes with a summation of effective historical counterinsurgency measures.  Security 
of the civilian population, interdiction of outside guerrilla support, good intelligence and 
development of hunter groups are just a few of the counterinsurgency measures 
discussed.  
The second part of the study offers brief biographical profiles of people who were 
theorists, instructors or participants in the insurgency/counterinsurgency operations 
reviewed earlier.  These brief sketches provide quick but important insights on how the 
individual contributed or failed to contribute to guerrilla warfare operations and/or 
theory.  In the end, approximately 150 individuals are profiled.  
Finally, the author concludes with bibliographical essays listing an extensive selection of 
English-language works on guerrilla warfare.  The studies are categorized by individual 
conflict, era (in terms of the Cold War), geographically and a variety of other ways.  This 
extensive bibliography provides a more than adequate starting point for anyone wanting 
to delve deeper into a particular insurgency.  
In summation, both works add significantly to the all too often neglected subject of 
guerrilla warfare.  The importance of understanding the complexities of guerrilla warfare 
cannot be over-stated.  This is especially true when one considers the reflection of one 
historian: "During this century, especially over the past 45 years, the suppression of 
insurgencies has been difficult."3  Another historian writes: "Those who wish to 
understand and explain the outcomes of modern warfare need to know when they can 
apply the calculus of conventional force ratios and when they must apply the 
extraordinary calculus of fortified compound war, by whose leverage 40,000 may, in the 
correct circumstances, defeat 200,000."4  Looking at today's environment with mass 
media coverage, relatively cheap balancing technology and growing budgetary 
constraints, US policy makers must carefully consider the costs of waging 
counterinsurgency operations.  Professor Joes' two studies provide a clearer 
understanding of these difficulties not only for policy makers, but also for students of 
guerrilla warfare as well.  
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Endnotes  
1. The army's new term for Operations Other Than War (OOTW) will be known as 
Support and Stability Operations (SASO) in next year's new FM 100-5 Operations 
manual.  
2. Thomas Huber, an instructor at the US Army Command and General Staff College, 
describes this idea in his article "Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound 
Warfare," The Evolution of Modern Warfare C610 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 
August 1997), p. 155.  
3. John Broom, "The Counterinsurgency Paradox."  Military Review, July-August, 1997 
[Online] Available http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/julaug97/broom.htm.  
4. Thomas Huber, The Evolution of Modern Warfare C610, p. 163.  
   
 
